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PRODUCTS LIABILITY - AuTOMOmLE MANUFACTUREs AIE
STRICTLY LIABLE IN TORT FOR DEFECTIVE DESIGN WHICH EN-
HANCES INJURIFES IN A COLLISION. Perez v. Ford Motor Co., 497
F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1974).
Plaintiff Perez and his daughter were seriously injured and his
wife was killed when the passenger compartment of the pickup truck
in which they were riding separated from the chassis and overturned
after being struck from the rear by another automobile at a speed dif-
ferential of approximately thirty miles per hour. In his action against
the truck manufacturer Perez alleged that a design defect caused loss
of control of the truck and thus compounded the injuries sustained by
its passengers.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed
the trial court,2 which had directed a verdict for the manufacturer on
the grounds that, as a matter of law, a rear-end collision at a thirty
miles an hour speed differential was not "normal use' of the vehicle.3
After reviewing Louisiana case law the federal appellate court con-
cluded that the "normal use' of a product must be determined by the
injured party's actual use of it and not the effect of intervening forces
upon that use.' The controlling fact was held to be the use to which
the truck was being put at the time of the accident and not the accident
itself.5 Therefore, upon proper proof on remand, the plaintiff would
be allowed to recover either under a theory of strict liability in tort or
under a negligence theory.
While a growing number of jurisdictions have allowed recovery
under general principles of negligence in so-called "second collision!'
cases, the Perez case added Louisiana to the few states holding automo-
bile manufacturers strictly liable in tort for defective design which en-
hances injuries in a collision. Conversely, under the majority view no
recovery can be had under any theory-whether negligence, breach of
warranty or strict liability-where the defective design did not cause
the initial accident. The jurisdictions adhering to this rule rely pri-
1. Perez v. Ford Motor Co., 497 F.2d 82, 84 (5th Cir. 1974).
2. Perez v. Ford Motor Co., No. C.A. 68-737 (E.D. La., Dec. 4, 1972).
3. 497 F.2d at 84.
4. Id. at 88.
5. Id. at 87.
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marily on the leading case of Evans v. General Motors Corp.," wherein
it was reasoned that an automobile manufacturer is under no duty to
make his automobile accident-proof, 7 that the intended purpose of an
automobile does not include collisions with other vehicless and that it
would be a legislative rather than a judicial function to require manu-
facturers to construct automobiles in which it would be safe to collide.'
Some or all of these propositions were adopted by the courts in other
jurisdictions in denying recovery in "second collision" cases.1°
The Eighth Circuit in Larsen v. General Motors Corp." rejected
the "intended use?' argument of Evans as too narrow and unrealistic
and held injuries caused by defective design to be readily foreseeable
as an incident to the normal and expected use of an automobile.1 2 The
court then stated an automobile manufacturer's duty in the following
terms:
We perceive of no sound reason, either in logic or experi-
ence, nor any command in precedent, why the manufacturer
should not be held to a reasonable duty of care in the design
of its vehicle consonant with the state of the art to minimize
the effect of accidents. The manufacturers are not insurers
but should be held to a standard of reasonable care in design
to provide a reasonably safe vehicle in which to travel ...
This duty of reasonable care in design rests on common
law negligence that a manufacturer of an article should use
reasonable care in the design and manufacture of his product
to eliminate any unreasonable risk of foreseeable injury.'"
It was at once apparent to the Larsen court that the accident-proof the-
ory advanced in Evans was not really at issue and thus irrelevant,' and
6. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966).
7. 359 F.2d at 824.
8. Id. at 825.
9. Id. at 824.
10. Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 945 (1968); Williams v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 376 F. Supp. 603, 605 (N.D.
Miss. 1974); McClung v. Ford Motor Co., 333 F. Supp. 17 (S.D. W. Va. 1971), af!'d
per curiam, 472 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1973); Shumard v. General Motors Corp., 270 F.
Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1967); Willis v. Chrysler Corp., 264 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D. Tex.
1967); Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 20 Md. App. 518, 317 A.2d 494 (1974); Gen-
eral Motors Corp. v. Howard, 244 So. 2d 726 (Miss. 1971); Ford Motor Co. v. Simpson,
233 So. 2d 797 (Miss. 1970); Walton v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 229 So. 2d 568 (Miss.
1969). See generally Annot., 42 A.L.R.3d 560 (1972); Hoenig and Werber, Automobile
"Crashworthiness": An Untenable Doctrine, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 578 (1971).
11. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
12. Id. at 502.
13. Id. at 503 (footnote omitted).
14. Id. at 502. See also Comment, Automobile Design Liability: Larsen v. General
Motors And Its Aftermath, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 299, 301 (1969).
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that, despite General Motor's contention to the contrary,'6 the enact-
ment of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 196616
did not have the effect of making safety standards in automobile design
an exclusively legislative function.' 7
As has been mentioned above, the jurisdictions which adopted the
Larsen approach as the more persuasive one, have generally based the
manufacturer's liability in "second collision' cases on negligence prin-
ciples.' 8 However, the Larsen opinion had expressly left open the pos-
sibility for each state to supplement common law negligence liability
with strict liability in tort.' 9 Some of the cases following Larsen did
then in fact extend the application of strict liability to actions based on
enhanced injuries caused by defective design. 0 It is worthwhile to
note that most of the jurisdictions in which these cases were decided
had previously recognized a theory of strict liability in tort in the prod-
ucts liability field based either on case law-as is true in the instant
case-or on Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 402A (1965).21
15. 391 F.2d at 506.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. (1970).
17. 391 F.2d at 506.
18. Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974); Bremier
v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C. 1972); Grundmanis v. Bri-
tish Motor Corp., 308 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Wis. 1970); Dyson v. General Motors Corp.,
298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Mieher v. Brown, 3 Ill. App. 3d 802, 278 N.E.2d
869 (1972); Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (Ct.
App. 1974); Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769 (Ct. App. 1973);
Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173, 42 A.L.R.3d 525 (1969). See gen-
erally Annot., 42 A.L.R.3d 560 (1972); Katz, Liability of Automobile Manufacturers
for Unsafe Design of Passenger Cars, 69 H&Rv. L. REV. 863 (1956); Nader and Page,
Automobile Design and the Judicial Process, 55 CAL. L. Rnv. 645 (1967); Sklaw, "Sec-
ond Collision" Liability: The Need For Uniformity, 4 SETON HALL. L. Rv. 499 (1973);
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability For Products, 44 Miss. LJ. 825 (1973);
Note, "Intended Use" And The Unsafe Automobile: Manufacturers' Liability For Negli-
gent Design, 28 MD. L. REv. 386 (1968); Comment, Automobile Design Liability: Lar-
sen v. General Motors And Its Aftermath, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 299 (1969); 24 VAND.
L. REV. 862 (1971).
19. 391 F.2d at 503 n.5.
20. Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974) (construing Rhode
Island law); Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972) (con-
struing Iowa law); Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969)
(construing Pennsylvania law); Culpepper v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 33 Cal. App.
3d 510, 109 Cal. Rptr. 110 (Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Badorek v. General Motors Corp.,
11 Cal. App. 3d 902, 90 Cal. Rptr. 305 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Brandenburger v. Toyota
Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 513 P.2d 268 (Mont. 1973); May v. Portland Jeep, Inc., 265
Or. 307, 509 P.2d 24 (1973); Baumgardner v. American Motors Corp., 83 Wash. 2d
751, 522 P.2d 829 (1974); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 11
Wash. App. 800, 525 P.2d 286 (1974).
21. R.STATEMENT (SEcoND) oF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
3
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Although Perez is merely another case extending the Larsen ap-
proach to the strict liability area, it does have significance especially
when considered with a view towards Oklahoma law. First of all, the
instant case, taken together with similar decisions over the past few
years," seems to confirm the existence of a slight judicial trend in favor
of allowing recovery in "second collision" cases on the basis of strict
liability, where that theory is already being recognized. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court in Kirkland v. General Motors Corp.23 adopted the
strict liability in tort doctrine for Oklahoma under the name of "Manu-
facturers' Products Liability. '2'  The standard of proof announced in
the Kirkland case25 is very similar to the one outlined in Perez,20 dif-
ferences in the language employed by the courts notwithstanding.
While Oklahoma has joined the jurisdictions allowing recovery un-
der a strict liability doctrine upon proper proof, its supreme court has
not had occasion to decide a controversy involving enhanced injuries
caused by defective design. However, the Tenth Circuit, construing
Oklahoma law in Marshall v. Ford Motor Co.,2 7 although affirming a
jury verdict in favor of the defendant manufacturer, took notice of the
fact that the trial court2s by its instructions had held the automobile
manufacturer to strict liability for a defective product unreasonably
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his prop-
erty, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or en-
tered into any contractual relation with the seller.
22. See cases cited notes 18 & 20 supra.
23. 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974).
24. Id. at 1361.
25. Id. at 1363. The Oklahoma court stated the proof requirements as follows:
First of all Plaintiff must prove that the product was the cause of the in-jury; the mere possibility that it might have caused the injury is not enough.
Secondly, Plaintiff must prove that the defect existed in the product, if the
action is against the manufacturer, at the time the product left the manufactur-
er's possession and control ....
Thirdly, Plaintiff must prove that the defect made the article unreasonably
dangerous to him or to his property ....
26. 497 F.2d at 86. The Fifth Circuit extracted the following standard of proof
from Louisiana case law:
The plaintiff first must prove that the manufacturer's product was defec-
tive. In order to establish defectiveness, the plaintiff must show that the prod-
uct was in normal use and that the product was unreasonably dangerous in that
use. After proving that the product was defective for normal use, the plaintiff
must then show that his injuries were caused by the defect.
27. 446 F.2d 712 (10thCir. 1971).
28. Marshall v. Ford Motor Co., No. 69-C-57 (N.D. Okla., Apr. 7, 1970).
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dangerous to the user.29  The plaintiff alleged defective design based
on the manufacturer's failure to provide a lock or catch on the folding
back of a split front seat. Upon collision, a rear passenger was thrown
against the folding back of the right front seat, and, since the plaintiff
was restrained by his seat belt, his body was compressed by the inten-
sity of the impact resulting in personal injuries. Although it was not
alleged that the claimed design defect caused the initial accident but
merely that it enhanced the plaintiffs injuries, the appellate court held
that it was for jury determination whether defective design proximately
caused the injuries to the plaintiff. 0
Impliedly then at least, Marshall seems to follow Larsen rather
than Evans and could be taken as an indication that Oklahoma may
adopt the Larsen approach once the "second collision" issue presents
itself to its courts in a proper case. The following concurring opinion
from Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,31 as quoted with approval in
Kirkland, is indicative of the overall progressive spirit in recent Okla-
homa products liability cases:3"
It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing of
products having defects that are a menace to the public. If
such products nevertheless find their way into the market it
is to the public interest to place the responsibility for what-
ever injury they may cause upon the manufacturer, who,
even if he is not negligent in the manufacture of the product,
is responsible for its reaching the market. However inter-
mittently such injuries may occur and however haphazardly
they may strike, the risk of their occurrence is a constant risk
and a general one. Against such a risk there should be gen-
eral and constant protection and the manufacturer is best sit-
uated to afford such protection.33
If an attempt be made to select the decisive factor from the rationale
underlying the various products liability cases involving enhanced inju-
ries caused by defective design, that factor would have to be the inter-
pretation of "intended purpose" or "normal use." It is the portion of
the Perez opinion dealing with this issue which may provide a useful
guideline for future Oklahoma decisions in this area. A comparison
29. 446 F.2d at 715. This was three years before the Oklahoma Supreme Court
adopted strict liability in tort in the Kirkland case.
30. 446 F.2d at 715.
31. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
32. Moss v. Polyco, Inc., 522 P.2d 622 (Okla. 1974); Kirkland v. General Motors
Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974).
33. 24 Cal. 2d at -, 150 P.2d at 441 (emphasis added). In Kirkland the quote
appears in 521 P.2d at 1362.
1975]
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between Louisiana case law relative to "normal use' as examined in
Perez34 and corresponding Oklahoma cases85 reveals that abnormal use
is a complete defense which will defeat recovery in both jurisdictions
but no precise definition as to what constitutes "normal use" can be
ascertained. It is submitted that the Perez court's "normal use" inter-
pretation in regard to "second collision" liability"0 is entirely consistent
with Oklahoma's "Manufacturers' Products Liability" doctrine and Ok-
lahoma case law in the products liability field. It should, therefore,
obtain in Oklahoma as well, with the result of allowing recovery under
theories of negligence and strict liability for enhanced injuries caused
by defective design once that issue is properly before the Oklahoma
courts.
Peter Bernhardt
34. 497 F.2d 82, 85-87. The court specifically considered Weber v. Fidelity &
Casualty Ins. Co., 259 La. 599, 250 So. 2d 754 (1971) and Williams v. Allied Chemical
Corp., 270 So. 2d 157 (La. Ct. App. 1972).
35. See, e.g., Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 859 (5th Cir.
1967) (construing Oklahoma law); McCready v. United Iron & Steel Co., 272 F.2d 700,
703 (10th Cir. 1959) (construing Oklahoma law); Pryor v. Lee C. Moore Corp., 262
F.2d 673, 674 (10th Cir. 1958) (construing Oklahoma law); Marker v. Universal Oil
Products Co., 250 F.2d 603, 606 (10th Cir. 1957) (construing Oklahoma law); Kirkland
v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1366 (Okla. 1974); Royse v. Stine, 473 P.2d
923, 925 (Okla. 1970); Barnhart v. Freeman Equipment Co., 441 P.2d 993, 999 (Okla.
1968); Crane Co. v. Sears, 168 Okla. 603, 608-09, 35 P.2d 916, 922 (1934).
36. See text accompanying notes 4 & 5 supra.
[Vol. 10: 703
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